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Generally speaking, a cult, in traditional societies, is a set of practices and 
beliefs of a group, in relation to a local god, for example, Owegbe or Ogboni 
cults. In these environments, cults or secret societies are formed to alleviate 
feelings of deprivation which may be economic, psychological, physical or 
mental. In scientifically-oriented cultures, cults or secret societies have little 
or no meaning except when their activities border on attitudinal 
discrimination against certain ethnic minorities. For example, in the Untied 
States, members of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) have expressed their prejudice 
against Blacks, Jews, Catholics through verbal, physical and psychological 
harassment. In Hegelian thought or logic, cult membership can be said to be 
a negation. Using ex-post facto research, backed by some ethnography, the 
study found that between 1999 and 2009 the political process in Nigeria has 
elevated cultism to criminal activities and political thuggery, fuelling a cabal 
theory. The Cabal makes the conduct of free and fair elections impossible, 
thereby distorting the doctrine of liberal democracy as exemplified in the 
April 25, 2009 re-run of the governorship election in Ekiti state of Nigeria. 
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Introduction 
In anthropology, a cult is a set of practices and beliefs of a group, in relation 
to a local god, for example, Owegbe or Ogboni cults. In sociology, it is a 
small group of religious activities, whose beliefs are typically syncretic, 
esoteric, and individualistic. Although it is related to the concept of religious 
sect, cult is not in Western society associated with mainstream Christianity.  
It has no precise scientific meaning because it is often difficult to dissociate 
the idea of a cult from its commonsense pejorative significance. Cult 
practices appear to satisfy the needs of alienated sections of urban, middle-
class youth. Cult membership amongst young people is typically transitory, 
spasmodic and irregular.  
Origin of Sects and Cults 
Humans have always wondered about their existence and purpose on earth. 
According to Tylor (1871/1958), the founder of the anthropology of religion, 
our ancestors – and contemporary non-industrial peoples – were particularly 
intrigued with death, dreaming, and trance. In dreams and trances, people see 
images they may remember when they wake up or come out of the trance 
state. Tylor concluded that attempts to explain dreams and trances led early 
humans to believe that two entities inhabit the body:  one active during the 
day and the other (soul) active during sleep and trance states.  Although they 
never meet, they are vital to each other. When the soul leaves the body, the 
person dies. Death is departure of the soul. From the Latin for soul, anima,  
Tylor named this belief animism. For Tylor, animism, the earliest form of 
religion, was a belief in spiritual beings. 
Religion a social institution, evolved through stages, beginning with animism 
and followed with polytheism.  Polytheism is belief in many goods with equal 
or relatively similar power. Hindu gods are often tribal, village, or caste 
deities associated with a particular place – a building, field, or mountain – or 
a certain object such as an animal or a tree. Monotheism is belief in a single, 
all – powerful god or deity.  People who subscribe to this faith have 
established religious organizations, religious leaders or priests, traditional 
rituals and sacred writings. 
Like all social institutions, religion has had to adapt to changing conditions of 
the modern world.  Many scholars have argued that religion’s adaptation has 
resulted in a long, continuous decline in its influence (Martin, 1978; 
Hammond, 1985). In supporting this view, Peter Berger (1977) has suggested 
that the only important sphere of influence that religion has today in modern 
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societies is in the family (rather than in the community) – that is, on a 
personal level of experience.  Following the Industrial Revolution (1750-
1850), religion has been separated from  government, from education, and 
from the marketplace.  It is no longer the primary cohesive force in societies, 
having been displaced by nationalism and other secular and political 
ideologies. The process by which society and culture become separated from 
religious connections and influences is called secularization.  (The opposite 
of secularization is sacralization, which occurs when social and cultural life 
become more religious and sacred in character). 
The decline of religion as an institution led to a new religious movements in 
the form of sects and cults.  Institutional religions ceased to claim a 
monopoly of the religious truth.  This led to religious pluralism where people 
can believe whatever they choose and need not follow a single set of teaching 
(Bruce, 2002).  Religious sects and cults reject some aspect of established 
religion.  Such religious groups as the Presbyterians, Baptists, Seventh Day 
Adventists and Jehovah’s Witnesses all began as sects. Sects that survive 
tend to move away from their pure state and become new churches or 
denominations. In the course of their evolution, sects may even come to 
resemble the organizations from which they originally separated.  As sects 
grow larger, they tend to become increasingly bureaucratic, the result is that 
the sect’s initial spontaneity and flexibility begin to disappear.  And as the 
sect becomes more like a church, members dissatisfied with doctrine or 
dogma may break away yet again to found a new sect (Stark & Bainbridge, 
1985). 
Historically, cults are headed by strong, flamboyant leaders such as Jim Jones 
of the People’s Temple of Guyana in South America.  In recent times, the 
People’s Temple is an example of a cult that evolved from an extreme but 
traditional Pentecostal religious sect (Bainbridge & Stark, 1979).  As the cult 
evolved and grew in popularity, Jones, a self-styled prophet, developed 
increasingly radical view on society and religion. Jones moved his members 
from the United States to an isolated environment in Guyana to eliminate 
threats to his leadership and to increase his power.  In the Temple, suicide 
rituals had been developed earlier as a way for his supporters to demonstrate 
their loyalty and commitment.  When Jones came to believe that his cult 
would be destroyed as a result of the murder of a visiting United States 
congressman, he ordered – and forced – his entire community to make a 
suicidal self-sacrifice.  As a result, nearly a thousand of his members 
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committed mass suicide in 1978.   Loyalty and commitment are critical 
factors in cult formation. 
According to Barker (1982) and Stark and Bainbridge (1985), people are 
driven to form religious sects and cults in an attempt to alleviate their 
feelings of deprivation.  Several types of deprivation can promote the growth 
of cults: 
• Deprivation can be economic, if income is inadequate and access to 
material goods is limited, or social, if people lack social status, 
power, prestige, and ability to join certain organizations or 
participate in certain activities. 
• Deprivation can be psychological, if one feels dissatisfaction with or 
rejection by society, even though one shares its values and material 
rewards.  This is similar to the Durkheimian theory of anomie.  
Durkheim (1893/1964) explained that anomie is a common 
occurrence when people’s expectations about rewards and 
gratifications are not closely matched by what they actually receive.  
In a gold rush, for example, many people believe that they can be 
wealthy overnight.  The norms that bind people to their conventional 
lives become weak, and as a result, some people abandon their 
families and job, travel long distances in search of riches and set up 
nontraditional communities (including joining or forming cults) that 
promote crime, violence, prostitution, and general disorder.  
• Deprivation can be physical or mental if it is based on a particular 
handicap.  To cope with this type of deprivation, people develop 
innovative means to pursue their goals. Robert K. Merton’s theory 
of structural strain is an adaptation of Durkheim’s anomie theory 
that emerged from the functionalist perspective of the structural 
sociology (Liska and Messner, 1999).  Merton (1968) built on 
Durkheim’s ideas and linked anomie to the achievement of goals 
and means.   He said that for large numbers of people in modern 
society, worldly success – especially as it finds expression in 
material wealth – has become a cultural goal.  However, only certain 
means – most commonly securing a good education and acquiring 
high – paying jobs – are the institutionalized and approved ways to 
achieve success.   There might not be a problem if everybody had 
equal access to these institutionalized means for realizing monetary 
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success, but this is not the case. The weak, the poor and ethnic 
minorities often find themselves handicapped by group exclusion, 
little formal education or few economic resources. In such situation, 
such people may engage in forming or joining cults, steal, 
burglarize, rob, or extort to secure money and purchase the symbols 
of success. 
Cults and Secret Societies in Nigeria 
Cult (or its derivative, cultism) and secret societies are common features in 
traditional societies. Traditional societies do usually exhibit conflict- ridden 
interpersonal relations, and thus cults and secret societies provide means to 
satisfy the need for success and importance – and in some cases, passage to 
nobility. In certain parts of West Africa and Central Africa, the Ogboni and 
Owegbe fraternities, and the panethnic sodalities are secret societies made up 
exclusively of men and women.  Like our college or university fraternities 
and sororities, these associations have secret initiation ceremonies.  Amongst 
the Mende tribe of Sierra Leone, men’s and women’s secret societies provide 
passage to nobility and influence.  The men’s group, the Poro trains boys in 
civic duties and organize positive collectivities for its members. In Nupe and 
Tiv ethnic groups in Nigeria, sex antagonism in witchcraft cults is a 
reflection of male wish for superiority in societies where the female are 
economically successful (Uweru, 1988). 
In traditional societies, there are no alternative ways of conceptualizing 
things since everyone shares the same world view.  In such a system, there 
may be no words for expressing doubt about established beliefs or any 
possibility of imagining some other view of reality.  In scientifically – 
oriented cultures, it is possible to separate ideas from reality; abstractions of 
almost infinite variety are possible.  This situation gives the thinker an 
opportunity to test out a series of models until he finds one that fits his 
particular need.  This encourages him to continue testing whenever the facts 
he observes do not seem to fit his theory – a classic case of scientific 
reasoning.  Thus, in scientifically –oriented cultures, cults and secret societies 
have little or no meaning except when their activities border on attitudinal 
discrimination against certain ethnic minorities. For example, in the United 
States of America, members of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) have expressed 
their prejudice against Blacks, Jews, and Catholics through verbal, physical 
and psychological harassment.  
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Secret Cults in Nigerian Universities and Colleges 
In 1953, Wole Soyinka (now a professor) with seven other students of the 
University College, Ibadan formed the Pyrate Confraternity (PC).  The idea 
of the founders of PC emerged from the impact of the Eagle, a campus 
magazine established to fight colonialism on campus and counter the 
influence of the Bug, a British Journal committed to the promotion of white 
superiority. In the 1950s, colonialism was becoming less fashionable in 
International politics fueling nationalism in colonized states.  In Nigeria, it 
took the form of attacks on British colonial policies through news papers, 
petitions, riots, strikes and students’ activism at the University College, 
Ibadan and overseas.   
Today the Pyrate Confraternity has metamorphosed into the National 
Association of Seadogs registered under the Corporate Affairs Commission. 
It is the negative students’ activism in the spirit of the Pyrate Confraternity 
that gave birth to the numerous secret groupings in Nigeria’s tertiary 
institutions: Pyrates, Buccaneers, Black Axe, Marphytes, Jurist, Vykings, 
Eiye, Amazons, Daughters of Jezebel, Black Brassieres.  
Research Problem 
The literature on cults and secret societies has shown that they are formed to 
alleviate feelings of deprivations: economic, physiological, physical or 
mental.  In conflict – ridden societies, they provide means to satisfy need for 
success and importance – and in some cases, passage to nobility. With the 
emergence of Fourth Republic in Nigeria in 1999, cultism has been elevated 
to criminal activities and political thuggery, fueling a cabal theory.  The 
question is: Is there a link between cultism and the conduct of free and fair 
elections since 1999 – fuelling a cabal theory?  
Research Methodology 
The data for this study was drawn from three sources: 
(i) List of political office holders and their socio-political networking 
with cults and militant groups in the Niger-Delta  1999-2009. 
(ii) List of prominent retired military officers who have penetrated 
Nigeria’s power aristocracy and members of the ruling Peoples 
Democratic Party.  
(iii) NGOs Reports on 1999, 2003, 2007 Elections and April 25, 2009 re-
run of the governorship election in Ekiti state of Nigeria. 
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The study involved interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with 
some members of Coalition of Democrats for Electoral Reform (CODER, 
Nigeria). 
Results 
Cultists have invaded the Nigeria political space, 1999-2009, thus elevating 
cultism to criminal activities, political thuggery and election rigging.  As a 
result, the country, since 1999, has witnessed stifling political atmosphere 
fuelling a cabal theory.  The ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) has 
dominated the political space with the ferocity of a bulldozer to the exclusion 
of other political parties. Consequently, the people has been denied the 
opportunity to choose their leaders, distorting the doctrine of liberal or 
constitutional democracy. 
Discussion:  The Issue of Voter’s Right 
One distinctive hallmark of constitutional democracy and why it is preferred 
to other forms of government is periodic election.  It offers a nation and its 
people opportunity to elect, re-elect or reject candidates who have offered 
themselves for public service.  Thus, without a periodic election in a 
democracy, the state and its people are doomed, because there will be no 
room for national renewal, policies and more importantly, the emergence of 
individuals (leaders) that stir the ship of state.    What this means is that the 
basic rubric of democracy is the people who should be accounted to on a 
periodic basis. The idea is connectivity between the people and their leaders 
– since genuine democracy is about transparency and accountability in 
government. 
Nigeria gained independence on October 1, 1960 from the British 
Government without much historicity of struggle.  This explains why at 
independence, the Nigerian federation was structurally and constitutionally 
designed in such a way that its Northern Region could always control the 
central government, with or without political support from the rest of the 
country.  Apart from the vast landmass resulting from topography and the 
dominant population figure gratuitously allocated to it, the North was 
awarded the same number of seats in the central legislature as both the 
Eastern and Western Regions combined.   From that point onwards, the 
prime political objective of the leaders of Northern Nigeria, who, ipso facto, 
became the ordained rulers of the country, was to maintain the constitutional 
and political privileges of the Nigerian independence settlement. Indeed, 
subsequent adjustments of this political construction through states creation 
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by military dictators, all of whom were of Northern extraction, were covert 
exercises in gerrymandering which accentuated the federation’s existing 
lopsidedness, and enhanced the North’s inherent advantages vis-à-vis the rest 
of the country.  Thus, the emergent Nigerian political system in 1960 was a 
product of skewed power structure.  
 
On May 29 1999, liberal democracy returned to Nigeria when civilians took 
over political authority at all tiers of government and the military retuned to 
the barracks for the second time since independence. In 1999-2009 the 
Nigerian democracy was in ill-fitting garments: cultism and political 
thuggery dominated the political space, fueling a cabal theory.  The cabal 
consisted of two amorphous power blocs:  the first can be traced to the 
Northern Nigerian ruling aristocracy which became modernized and 
privileged by the vagaries of colonial rule and the transfer of power at 
Nigerian political independence in 1960, and the second consisted of 
prominent retired military officers, now political surrogates, who have 
penetrated Nigeria’s power aristocracy.  The cabal theory holds that the 
Nigerian power oligarchy wants to rule Nigeria in perpetuity.  This implies 
the holding by Northerners, of the position of president, and of strategic 
institutions for security, economic resources, finance and the judiciary.  To 
perpetuate themselves in power, the cabal employs various means - cultism, 
political thuggery, emasculation of the opposition at the point of political 
succession.  This scenario perverted the democratic process where state 
organs and cultists were used to rig elections at all levels.  This has been the 
position in the period under review.  The voter’s right did not count.   
Against this background, Nigeria today faces a lot of challenges on many 
fronts:  Niger – Delta rebellion, Islamic Boko Haram insurrection, mass 
poverty and alienation, state robbery and corruption, cultism and high – 
profile election rigging, institutionalized anarchy, industrial unrest, state 
delinquency, etc.  All these problems- and many more – have led to the 
question: is the Nigerian state a failed or delinquent state? 
Htt://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/politics/development defines a failed state as a 
state: 
(i) That can no longer perform its basic security and development 
functions and that has no effective control over its territory and 
borders. 
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(ii) That can no longer reproduce the conditions for its own existence. 
Without going into the technical definition of a state, a state has three broad 
functions: 
(i) Coercive function which has to do with providing security to the 
social order and the ruling social classes and blocs for the status-quo 
to remain and be strengthened and by extension, the citizenry who 
serve the social order and the ruling classes and blocs. 
(ii) Ideological function which is the weapon (idea) used by the state to 
maintain and reproduce power.  It takes the forms of ideas and 
institutions such as schools, religious doctrines and institutions, 
political parties and social movements, cultural and traditional 
institutions and practices, etc. 
(iii) Socio-economic functions which involves providing the general 
conditions of production and the maintenance of the economy.  As 
the recent Economic Meltdown has shown, the ruling classes and 
blocs cannot privatize everything – roads, telecommunications, 
electricity, schools, industries, air transportations, etc, and still 
remain in power.  The competition between the various fractions 
and individuals, and the extreme selfishness of most of them will 
tear the state apart or grind it to a halt.  Thus, a superstructure 
(government) within the Keynesian thought must be put in place to 
coordinate the economy in the interest of the ruling classes and 
blocs as a whole. 
A state that performs the above functions can be regarded as an enduring 
state - the opposite of a failed state. To further differentiate the two, 
htt://en.wikipedia.org/politics/development provided three indicators of a 
failing state:  
(i) Social indicators:   demographic pressures; massive movements of 
refugees and internally displaced peoples; legacy of vengeance – 
seeking groups; and chronic and sustained human flight. 
(ii) Economic Indicators:  uneven economic development along group 
(ethnic) lines; and sharp/severe economic decline. 
(iii) Political Indicators:  criminalization/delegitimisation of the state; 
progressive deterioration of public services; widespread violation of 
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human rights; security apparatus as state within a state; rise of 
fractionalized elite; and intervention of external states. 
The indicators are elastic enough to cover all known state problems. 
Employing these indicators, we return to our question:  Is Nigeria a failed 
state?  Given the earlier definition of a failed state, Nigeria is not yet a failed 
state though its citizens lack basic infrastructures:  the average Nigerian 
carries on almost without government.  He or she provides himself or herself 
with portable water, electricity, security, medicare, children’s education, etc.  
However, there is a government in place dominated by a cabal-the ruling 
aristocracy.  In this thesis, Nigeria may be regarded as a delinquent state 
where delinquency is measured by the degree to where the state does not 
satisfy the ordinary (basic) existential needs of the people.  A delinquent state 
tends to a failed state when failure to carry out the three basic functions of an 
enduring state invites rebellions, insurrections, anarchy, ‘states within a 
state’,  revolutions, etc.  This is where Nigeria can be regarded as a 
delinquent state. 
Summary 
In the period, 1999-2009, the voter’s right did not count. In the last ten years, 
our study has shown that elections – by implication democracy - are 
compromised with the help of cult and militant groups, and the state police.  
Elections in Nigeria, in the period under review, are nothing but state 
organized crime, fuelling a cabal theory: a power oligarchy that wants to rule 
Nigeria in perpetuity, promoting bad governance, corruption and poverty.  In 
this scenario, many problems emerged: insecurity, ethnic- religious 
insurrections, institutionalized anarchy and industrial unrest.  This is what 
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